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COERCION: THE LOST ELEMENT OF ESTABLISHMENT
MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL*
Professor Kurland has warned against "law office" history-the
history that "brief writers write," "picking and choosing state-
ments and events favorable to the client's cause".1 His warning is
well-taken. Few areas of the law have suffered so much from law
office history as have the religion clauses of the first amendment.
Perhaps I betray my recent past as a brief writer in this field, how-
ever, if I suggest that the damage wrought by the brief writers' law
office histories pales into insignificance when compared to the law
office history of the United States Supreme Court.
In these days of the Meese-Brennan debate about the signifi-
cance of the original intention of the framers of the Constitution, it
is like stepping into a time warp to read the establishment clause
opinions of the 1940's, 1950's, and 1960's. Was it really Justice
Brennan in Abington School District v. Schempp2 who told us
that, in deciphering the first amendment, "the line we must draw
between the permissible and the impermissible is one which ac-
cords with history and faithfully reflects the understanding of the
Founding Fathers?"3 Mr. Meese, I have a promising candidate for
you for a judicial appointment.
Of course, a few changes have occurred since 1963. Not least
among them has been the Court's realization-painful, as in cases
like Marsh v. Chambers4 -that its rigorously separationist picture
of the intentions and actions of the Founding Fathers was seriously
misleading as a matter of history. One no longer can maintain, as
Justice Rutledge did, that the Framers originally intended the reli-
gion clauses "to create a complete and permanent separation of the
spheres of religious activity and civil authority by comprehensively
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
1. Kurland, The Origins of the Religion Clauses of the Constitution, 27 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 839, 841-42 (1986).
2. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
3. Id. at 294 (Brennan, J., concurring).
4. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
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forbidding every form of public aid or support for religion. '
Whatever directions our historical research ultimately may lead, it
now seems beyond doubt that, as Justice Harlan observed, "the
historical purposes of. . . the First Amendment are significantly
more obscure and complex than [the Supreme] Court has hereto-
fore acknowledged." 6
The Supreme Court's response to these developments has not
been encouraging. Essentially, what once was declared necessary
because of history now is declared necessary because of precedent.
7
In his Article, Professor Kurland has refused "to dwell on whether
the true meaning of the Constitution can be determined by seeking
the intention of the Framers."' 8 For present purposes, I intend to
follow his lead. In the jurisprudential shift from original intention
to general principles, however, it seems only right to call time out
to reexamine those holdings of the Court that were products of
faulty history and that have yet to be justified on any other theo-
retical basis.
One such holding is the Court's statement in Engel v. Vitale9
that "[tihe Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause,
does not depend upon any showing of direct governmental compul-
sion and is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an
official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce non-
observing individuals- or not."' 0 Before looking to the historical
support, or lack of it, for this proposition, three brief observations
about how this proposition came to enter the law are appropriate.
First, the Court's statement was without the support of prece-
dent. In Cantwell v. Connecticut," the Court had paraphrased the
establishment clause as "forestal[ling] compulsion by law of the ac-
ceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship,"'"
and the presence or lack of compulsion, respectively, had been
5. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
6. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 125 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
7. At least, that is how I read the majority opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38
(1985).
8. Kurland, supra note 1, at 841.
9. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
10. Id. at 430.
11. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
12. Id. at 303.
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central to the Court's decisions in McCollum v. Board of Educa-
tion"s and Zorach v. Clauson,'4 which concerned release time pro-
grams in the public schools. And just one year before Engel, Chief
Justice Warren had explained the distinction between Sunday
closing laws and the release time program in McCollum on the ba-
sis that Sunday closing laws did not compel religious participa-
tion. 5 Finally, Engel itself conspicuously fails to supply supporting
authority for the Court's position.
Second, the Court's statement was unnecessary to its decision.
After informing us that compulsion-or at least "direct" compul-
sion-is not an element of an establishment clause claim, the
Court pointed out, in its next breath: "This is not to say, of course,
that [school prayers] do not involve coercion. . . . When the
power, prestige, and financial support of government is placed be-
hind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure
upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially ap-
proved religion is plain."" I agree. If I did not agree, I would find
it difficult to identify any substantial constitutional right violated
by public school prayers.
My third observation is that the Court's decision to abjure coer-
cion as an element of an establishment clause claim essentially was
without explanation. In Engel, the Court stated that the purposes
of the establishment clause "go much further" than preventing
even indirect religious compulsion.17 The Court's reasons, however,
were that a fully compulsory established church in the United
States and in England historically had "incurred the hatred, disre-
spect and even contempt of those who held contrary beliefs,"' 8 and
that established churches "go hand in hand" with religious perse-
cution.19 These facts seem merely to reinforce that compul-
sion-yes, even persecution-had been an element of the estab-
lished church as our forefathers knew it.
13. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
14. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
15. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 451-52 (1961).
16. Engel, 370 U.S. at 430-31.
17. Id. at 431.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 432.
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The Court's statement in Engel, therefore, is mysterious in many
ways. Nonetheless, without precedent, without explanation, and, as
the Court admitted, without relevance to the case in which it was
announced, the notion has been introduced into the law that the
establishment clause does not involve an element of coercion. The
proposition has been passed down, with an ever-lengthening string
of citations, to be applied in cases in which so-called establish-
ments can be found by courts even though nobody's religious lib-
erty has been infringed in any way.
Lest it be thought that only the separationists have disregarded
the coercion element of an establishment, then-Associate Justice
Rehnquist seems to have done likewise in his dissenting opinion in
Wallace v. Jaffree.20 According to Justice Rehnquist, the establish-
ment clause "forbade establishment of a national religion, and for-
bade preference among religious sects or denomina-
tions 21-nothing more. Despite having quoted Madison's words,
Justice Rehnquist failed to mention that under the first amend-
ment Congress cannot "compel men to worship God in any manner
contrary to their conscience '22 or compel them to "conform" 23 to
any religion not of their own choosing. It is easy to imagine forms
of nonpreferential aid, short of establishing a national church, that
nonetheless would have the effect of coercing a religious obser-
vance. While the majority of the justices concern themselves with
whether measures favor religion over nonreligion, and their oppo-
nents focus instead on whether measures favor one religion over
another, the central issue of religious choice is disregarded by both
sides.
Let us turn then to the historical record. In the debates in the
First Congress concerning the wording of the first amendment,
James Madison, the principal draftsman and proponent, said of
the committee draft that he "apprehended the meaning of the
words to be, that Congress should not establish a religion, and en-
force the legal observation of it by law, nor compel men to worship
20. 472 U.S. 38, 91-114 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
21. Id. at 106.
22. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 730 (J. Gales ed. 1834) (Aug. 15, 1789). Different editions of the
Annals of Congress have different pagination; the date is the surest way to find particular
passages.
23. Id. at 731.
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God in any manner contrary to their conscience." '24 Upon further
questioning by those who feared that the proposed amendment
"might be taken in such latitude as to be extremely hurtful to the
cause of religion, '2 Madison clarified the point. He stated that he
"believed that the people feared one sect might obtain a pre-
eminence, or two combine together, and establish a religion to
which they would compel others to conform. ' 2 Is compulsion an
element of an establishment clause violation? If Madison's expla-
nations to the First Congress are any guide, compulsion is not just
an element, it is the essence of an establishment.
Curiously, in all the pages of the United States Reports canvass-
ing the history of the period for clues as to the meaning of the
religion clauses, no majority or concurring opinion ever has relied
on these words by Madison. Indeed, until Justice Rehnquist dis-
sented in Wallace v. Jaffree,27 no justice ever had seriously ana-
lyzed the debates on the framing of the first amendment in any
opinion on any side of any religion clause question. This is not be-
cause history was deemed irrelevant, because during much of that
time the Court had purported to be judging in accordance with
original intent. Nor is it because Madison's views were deemed un-
important. Madison's opinions concerning church-state questions
propounded before the amendment, after the amendment, at every
time except when he was explaining the meaning of the amend-
ment to the First Congress, have been treated as key to an under-
standing of the amendment. Under ordinary principles of legisla-
tive history, Madison's statements on the floor of Congress are of
the greatest weight.
But let us look as well at Madison's famous Memorial and Re-
monstrance Against Religious Assessments, 28 what Justice Rut-
ledge called Madison's "complete, though not his only, interpreta-
24. Id. at 730.
25. Id. (Rep. Huntington).
26. Id. at 731.
27. 472 U.S. 38, 91-114 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
28. Madison, A Memorial and Remonstrance (circa June 20, 1785) [hereinafter cited as
Memorial and Remonstrance]. The Memorial and Remonstrance has been reprinted widely.
See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 63-72 (1947) (appendix to opinion of Rut-
ledge, J., dissenting).
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tion of religious liberty."2 The Court has relied on the Memorial
and Remonstrance many times in its search for the original intent
of the framers of the religion clauses. What does the Memorial and
Remonstrance have to say about compulsion and establishment? It
states: (1) that the proposed bill for the support of teachers of the
Christian religion would be a "dangerous abuse"30 if "armed with
the sanctions of a law";3' (2) that religion "can be directed only by
reason and conviction, not by force or violence";3 2 (3) that govern-
ment should not be able to "force a citizen to contribute"3' even so
much as three pence to the support of a church; (4) that such a
government would be able to "force him to conform to any other
establishment in all cases whatsoever"; 4 (5) that "compulsive sup-
port" of religion is "unnecessary and unwarrantable";," and (6)
that "attempts to enforce by legal sanctions, acts obnoxious to so
great a proportion of Citizens, tend to enervate the laws in gen-
eral."3 Again, legal compulsion to support or participate in reli-
gious activities would seem to be the essence of an establishment.
The result of Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance, as Profes-
sor Kurland has recounted, was passage of Virginia's Act for Es-
tablishing Religious Freedom. 7 Professor Kurland already has di-
rected our attention to the key words: "[N]o man shall be
compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place, or
ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or
burthened in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on ac-
count of his religious opinions or belief."' 8 It is difficult to see, on
this evidence, how an establishment could exist in the absence of
some form of coercion.
Professor Kurland also has noted that the religion clauses can be
best understood "not merely by examining what its authors and
29. Everson, 330 U.S. at 37.
30. Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note 27, preamble.
31. Id.
32. Id. T 1.
33. Id. 3.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. 1 13.
37. Ch. 34 (1786), 12 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE 84 (1823).
38. Id. § II, 12 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE at 86, quoted in Kurland, supra note 1, at
852.
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contemporaries said about them, but also by examining the
problems that the Founding Fathers encountered, remembered,
and sought to solve.""9 Here again, the problems that the Founders
had encountered were that the government had sought to compel
adherence to one religion or, in some colonies, one of several reli-
gions, and that the government had sought to restrain adherence
to the others. The establishment and free exercise clauses arose
out of these very problems.
Subsequent history confirms this thesis. Exponents of strict sep-
aration are embarrassed by the many breaches in the wall of sepa-
ration countenanced by those who adopted the first amendment:
the appointment of congressional chaplains, the provision in the
Northwest Ordinance for religious education, the resolutions call-
ing upon the President to proclaim days of prayer and
thanksgiving, the Indian treaties under which Congress paid the
salaries of priests and clergy, and so on. These actions, so difficult
to reconcile with modern theories of the establishment clause, are
much easier to understand if one sees religious coercion as the fun-
damental evil against which the clause is directed. Even if one
would take a different view on the specific issues today, perhaps
because of a broader sense of coercions stemming from the perva-
sive influence of the modern welfare-regulatory state, these exam-
ples demonstrate that noncoercive supports for religion were not
within the contemporary understanding of an establishment of re-
ligion. Strong evidence suggests that discrimination among reli-
gious sects also was proscribed by the establishment clause, but I
have run across no persuasive evidence that the Framers of the
first amendment considered evenhanded support for all religions or
religion in general, in the absence of a coercive impact an estab-
lishment of religion.
Why does this matter? At the most obvious level, it suggests
that the courts are wasting their time when they draw nice distinc-
tions about various manifestations of religion in public life that en-
tail no use of the taxing power and have no coercive effect.40 The
simple answer to most such lawsuits is that the plaintiff has no
standing to sue. More importantly, the analysis suggests that the
39. Kurland, supra note 1, at 845.
40. E.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
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courts should be more hospitable to liberty-enhancing accommoda-
tions of religion, like the Connecticut law struck down last year
that prevented workers from being fired for refusing to work on
their chosen Sabbath.41
On the other hand, my analysis suggests that aid to religion
must not be structured to influence or distort religious choice.
Merely because aid may be neutral among religions does not mean
that it is consistent with the noncoercion standard. For example, a
program of tuition grants to attend private schools, limited to reli-
gious private schools, would be neutral among religions but obvi-
ously would interfere with religious choice. A noncoercion standard
protects nonbelievers and those indifferent to religion no less than
it protects believers.
Doctrinally, renewed attention to coercion suggests that the
Court's three-part test for an establishment of religion 42 should be
modified. A rule that forbids government actions with the purpose
or effect of advancing religion fails to distinguish between efforts
to coerce and influence religious belief and action, on the one hand,
and efforts to facilitate the exercise of one's chosen faith, on the
other. It is meaningless to speak of "advancing" religion without
specifying the reference point. To protect religious freedom against
persecution "advances" religion, as does treating religion neutrally
if the prior practice had been to discriminate against it.
Recognition of the centrality of coercion-or, more precisely, its
opposite, religious choice-to establishment clause analysis would
lead to a proscription of all government action that has the pur-
pose and effect of coercing or altering religious belief or action.
Under this standard, the Court would sustain many worthwhile,
progressive social programs that it has struck down in the
past-programs such as remedial education for economically and
educationally deprived children on the premises of their own
schools. 43 The point here is not that the government may under-
take to aid religion, but that it can pursue its legitimate purposes
even if to do so incidentally assists the various religions.
41. See Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
42. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
43. Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985).
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A noncoercion standard, of course, would not answer all ques-
tions. For example, it obviously would not answer the question,
"What is coercion?" Enormous variance exists between the perse-
cutions of old and the many subtle ways in which government ac-
tion can distort religious choice today. This is no less true under
the establishment clause than it is under the free exercise clause,
where the Court has recognized the problem."" But while there will
be room for continuing debate and disagreement concerning the
definition of coercion, at least attention again would be directed to
the right question. Not what flunks the three-part test, but what
interferes with religious liberty, is an establishment of religion.
44. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1963).
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